Syrian Chemical Weapons of Mass Confusion

Over the course of the last few days several articles were published on the Syrian chemical weapons, the initial two in the New York Times[1], and in The Atlantic[2]. On the basis of intelligence information, these articles indicated that some movement was detected recently in the chemical weapons facilities in Syria, and that Israel asked twice for Jordanian consent to attacking those facilities over the last month. It was also mentioned in the past by specialist that in order for those weapons to be used, there are several steps that need to be taken first, such as transferring the different agents, which are never stored together, and mounting those on a weaponized carrier. Same experts stressed that the Syrian chemical weapons cannot be deployed instantly, and such movement would point to a potential motivation to deploy them.

The unstable situation of civil war in Syria makes these weapons of mass destruction a potential hazard to Syrians, but also to the surrounding nations as well. While the global community fears Assad's loyalist would use these against the Syrian people as means of last resort, a chemical expression of Assad’s ‘Let my soul die with the philistines’, there are also other concerns in the region. Turkey suspects that Assad would bomb areas close to its border, allowing for collateral damage to spill over and leaving Turkey to deal with the catastrophe. Israel fears that these weapons might be passed on by Assad to his allies, the Hizballah, equipping this extremist Shiite organization on its border with a tiebreaker weapon.

Further concern can be attributed to the fact that global jihadist, of the Al-Qaida variety, are a part of the opposition fighting Assad's troops. These kind of weapons falling into those kind of hands can find their way to be used in a variety of scenarios such as in Iraq against the Shiite population, in Egypt against the Mursi administration, in Saudi against American targets, or against any of the numerous enemies the Salafi oriented Jihadist groups have vowed to destroy.

To collaborate these suspicions, one has just to examine the aftermath of the Libyan "Arab Spring", and to follow the trail of the missiles, anti-aircraft/marine vessel guided weapons, and other munitions, that left storage rooms in Libya, and surfaced in Sinai desert, on trucks in Sudan, and in other parts of the Middle East. Such weapons were used against Mursi's army by Jihadist groups in the latest round a couple of months ago. These are the same type of weapons that were used against the IDF, the Israeli army, by Jihadist crossing over from Sinai into Israel. These are of the same Salafi oriented groups that were responsible for the death of the American Ambassador to Benghazi, and the Al-Qaida cells that are responsible for the incredible death toll in Iraq that reached 365[3] in last September as a result of the attacks on Shia civilian targets.

On the macro scale, the chemical weapons situation marks the concerns about post-Assad Syria. It is obvious to the different actors in the region that Assad’s days as the ruler of Syria are numbered, but it is quite in the mist what shape will the future Syria take. Currently, the struggle of the last relic of the Ba’ath socialist regime in the Middle East, for the most part has turned into a cross Islamic war between Sunnis and Alawite-represented-Shiites. In the mind of the Ayatollah regime in Iran, this is a battle for the geographical integrity of what the King of Jordan, King Abdallah, referred to as “The Shiite Crescent”, a connection between the Shiite communities in the different countries in the Middle East. This battle is already underway in Iraq, and does not seem to be coming to its final resolution in the near future.

Concerned parties are wondering whether driving Assad away, will actually bring a halt to aggression, or will it in fact turn Syria into an extension of the battle waging next door in Iraq. It is yet uncertain whether the Shiite hegemon of the region, Iran, will give up its ally along with a convenient land bridge to its proxy army, the Hizballah in Lebanon, or will it continue to send in the Revolutionary Guards in order to maintain some sort of a supply route across Syria. On the other hand, there are also concerns that the strife will continue to spill over to the other Shia-Sunni mixed countries in the region, as it has in Lebanon and Bahrain over the last few months.  It seems that not only the Syrian people are fighting for their future, but also the Islamic Jihadist, and the Shiite Crescent.

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/world/middleeast/syria-moves-its-chemical-weapons-and-gets-another-warning.html?_r=0

[2] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/israel-asked-jordan-for-approval-to-bomb-syrian-wmd-sites/265818/

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/27/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE89Q05O20121027

Difference of Perspectives

-------   A friend of mine wrote me a message asking about the relations between Israel and the USA in the context of the Middle East and the Iranian threat. It is followed by my response.

What's the comfort level in Israel with President Obama's so-called strategy vis a vis Iran? We don't know what to make of it over here. A few months back we were smacking the hell out of the Libyans for humanitarian reasons. Now we're posturing while Syrians are being massacred by their leaders. I think our message is "we'll take care of the little bullies, but when it comes to the big ones who push back you're on your own." Your thoughts?

------   My response

Well ****, President Obama is obviously doing what he believes is best for the United States of America. Having said that, albeit the long standing friendship between the two nations, what's best for the US is not always best for Israel. Obama says he's not practicing containment, but he is, though it is as much as every democrat administration in the US has done in the past, so little surprise there.

On the Israeli side of the map, things look very different from here. Here Israel is facing a autocratic regime with a record of 30 years of hostility, bluntly declaring it's desire to 'wipe the Zionists off the face of the earth'. This regime is currently lacking the ability to do so but is steadily working at it. Israel's experience with these type of threats thus far has been very positive: In 1981 a nuclear facility in Iraq was blasted from the air and in 2007 a Syrian similar facility was destroyed in the same manner. On both occasion Israel operated on its own, regardless of American objections, and succeeded in preserving a balance in the weapons race of the middle east, so claimed by foreign press.

Though the Iranian enterprise is much different from the ones mentioned above in its complexity and the right approach to destroying it, it still presents the same threat for Israel - annihilation. Therefor you can understand the reluctance of Israel to wait till the last second before attempting to resolve the issue. Notwithstanding the risk of opening a full scale war in the region, Israel prefers a preemptive strike on its own terms.

That being said, it is not necessarily the right course of action in order to rid Israel and the world of the Iranian threat. A skillful eye would notice that efforts to delay nuclear accomplishments in Iran are side by side with efforts to support a regime change in the country. The intent behind such maneuvers are not just to have Ahmadinejad step down, something that may happen in any case in the near future, but to facilitate any alternative, hopefully a sound and rational movement, to take the place of the Ayatollah regime. This perception allows for nuclear development but in the hands of a responsible government.

As far as the difference between Libya and Syria, the answer is simple and sad: oil, or the lack of for the latter. But this might not be a bad thing. Learning mistakes from past affairs - Iraq, Afghanistan - is crucial in the paradigm of western involvement in Arab/Muslim/Middle Eastern problems. In the Libyan case this was demonstrated in a sense: western involvement was kept to exterior parameters, and to preserving proper conduct of war. In a way it was basically leveling the playing field. This allowed for a leadership to rise from the ashes, and for some sort of accountability in post revolution times. The situation in Syria is much different.

Syria is marked by a non unified society that its only cohesive factor was the government. There is no real leadership to take the wheel against Assad, thus there is no one figure for the west to support. Whether such a leadership will develop, perhaps a coalescence of FSA and the SNC, time will tell. Until then the west' best move is to steer clear of direct involvement. Having said that, there is much to be done under the guise of humanitarian relief.

I think the main tones of my answer are these: The US has to understand that this region needs to consider its own interests first with local matters, especially when it comes to security, and that things which are apparent here, are not always obvious from over there.